Non-Financial Risk Disclosure: The Case of the UK’s Distressed Banks by Adelopo, Ismail
Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance
Journal
Volume 11 | Issue 2 Article 3
Non-Financial Risk Disclosure: The Case of the
UK’s Distressed Banks
Ismail Adelopo
Bristol Business School, Bristol UK, ismail.adelopo@uwe.ac.uk
Follow this and additional works at: http://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj
Copyright ©2017 Australasian Accounting Business and Finance Journal and Authors.
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information contact the UOW Library:
research-pubs@uow.edu.au
Recommended Citation
Adelopo, Ismail, Non-Financial Risk Disclosure: The Case of the UK’s Distressed Banks, Australasian
Accounting, Business and Finance Journal, 11(2), 2017, 23-42. doi:10.14453/aabfj.v11i2.3
Non-Financial Risk Disclosure: The Case of the UK’s Distressed Banks
Abstract
This study investigates the narratives risk disclosures of the four British financial institutions that were
adversely affected during the 2008 banking crisis. This investigation uses content analysis with the aid of
Concordance software to explore the risk disclosure of these companies for the period 1998-2008. Risk
disclosures in the Business Review sections of the annual reports of the banks were analysed into their historic
and forward looking contents, and current firm performance was measured with respect to earnings per share
(EPS) and dividend, while future performance was measured by growth in EPS, and positive time lag in EPS.
Consistent with its predictions, the study found a significant negative relationship between the extent of
historic narrative disclosures and current and future firm performance, and a significant positive relationship
between forward looking narrative risk disclosures and both current and future firm performance. Additional
analysis shows that optimistic and pessimistic narrative risk disclosures are not significant in explaining
current and future firm performance for these firms.
Findings from this study are important for users of the financial statements and regulators because they
highlight an opportunity to detect warning signals for companies at risk of collapse. The study adds to the
growing number of empirical investigations that provide alternative approaches to understanding business
failures.
Keywords
Risk Disclosure, Narratives, Business failures, Content Analysis, Panel Approach, Northern Rock;, Bradford
and Bingley, Royal Bank of Scotland, Halifax Bank of Scotland
This article is available in Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal: http://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj/vol11/iss2/3
Non-Financial Risk Disclosure: 
The Case of the UK’s Distressed Banks 
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Abstract 
This study investigates the narratives risk disclosures of the four British financial institutions that 
were adversely affected during the 2008 banking crisis. This investigation uses content analysis 
with the aid of Concordance software to explore the risk disclosure of these companies for the 
period 1998-2008. Risk disclosures in the Business Review sections of the annual reports of the 
banks were analysed into their historic and forward looking contents, and current firm 
performance was measured with respect to earnings per share (EPS) and dividend, while future 
performance was measured by growth in EPS, and positive time lag in EPS. 
Consistent with its predictions, the study found a significant negative relationship between the 
extent of historic narrative disclosures and current and future firm performance, and a significant 
positive relationship between forward looking narrative risk disclosures and both current and 
future firm performance. Additional analysis shows that optimistic and pessimistic narrative risk 
disclosures are not significant in explaining current and future firm performance for these firms. 
Findings from this study are important for users of the financial statements and regulators 
because they highlight an opportunity to detect warning signals for companies at risk of collapse. 
The study adds to the growing number of empirical investigations that provide alternative 
approaches to understanding business failures. 
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1. Introduction  
 
There are an increasing number of studies addressing behavioural finance issues including, for 
example, impression management (Garcia Osman and Guillamon-Saorin, 2011; Godfrey et al., 
2003; Aerts, 2005), narrative tones (Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Smith and Taffler, 2000; 
Hooghiemstra, 2000), management optimism and overconfidence (Campbell et al., 2011; Doukas 
and Petmezas, 2007; Trevelyan, 2008; Hussainey et al., 2003). These areas of finance research 
are receiving increased attention as it is becoming obvious that non-financial information is also 
important in understanding management intentions and decision making. Although the financial 
crisis has been the focus on many studies, no recent study has considered the risk disclosure 
dimensions of this period and their information content, especially the performance related 
signals in the risk disclosure of the distressed UK banks.   
 
This study examined the case of the four UK banks that were distressed during the rare and 
relatively (since 1866; run on Overend Gurney) unprecedented events of the banking crisis and 
the symbolic “Banking Run” of 2007 in the UK. The financial crisis has had far reaching 
implications on various aspects of finance and financial managements including, for example, 
banking and financial regulation, investment and financing decisions, and risk management 
(House of Commons, 2009). Consistent with previous studies that have addressed the recent 
financial crisis (Shin, 2009; Congdon et al., 2009; Hall, 2008; Chick, 2008; Lastra, 2008; 
Acharya et al., 2009; Goddard et al., 2009), this study adopts a case study approach which 
necessarily restricts the observations for the investigation although it may not prevent 
meaningful empirical analysis as it allows an in-depth analysis of limited number of observations 
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008).   
 
The focus of analysis in this investigation is on the non-financial narrative information in the risk 
disclosure contained in the Business Review section of the annual reports of Northern Rock, 
Bradford and Bingley, Halifax Bank of Scotland and Royal Bank of Scotland. The main issue 
addressed in this paper is the features of the risk disclosure by these banks and whether there are 
credible signals about their distress in the non-financial narratives in their annual reports. The 
rest of the paper is structured as follow; section 2 discusses the Banking Crises in the UK. 
Section 3 presents the literature review and hypotheses. Section 4 presents the methodology. 
Section 5 presents results and analysis of findings. Section 6 concludes the paper and identifies 
opportunities for future research 
 
2. The UK Banking Crisis  
 
The UK has a long and well-established banking history that dates back centuries and one of the 
most concentrated banking sectors with the four biggest banks accounting for about 85% of the 
small lending market (Liikanen, 2012). Table 1 below shows the market capitalisations of the 
UK banks in the FTSE 100 index during and after the financial crisis. The FTSE 100 represents 
85% of the total market capitalisation of the companies listed on the London Stock Exchange.  
The five biggest banks (which used to be 10 biggest Major British Banking Group and used to 
consist of the nine institutions in Table 1 below plus Abbey National but now essentially consist 
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of the five that survived the banking crisis; (HSBC, Barclays, RBS, Lloyds Banking Group and 
Standard Chartered) account for roughly 25% of this total. 
Table 1: Market Capitalisation of Banks in the FTSE100 (2007-2009) (£Billion) 
Banks in the FTSE 100 02 April 
2007 
07 April 
2008 
06April 
2009 
21 April 
2014 
Alliance and Leicester  5.0 2.2   
Barclays  47.1 32.1 14.3 39.7 
Bradford and Bingley 2.9    
HBOS 39.3 21.5   
HSBC 103.1 100.9 74.8 195.2 
Lloyds TSB/Lloyds Banking Group  31.6 25.8 12.9 52.5 
Northern Rock 4.8    
RBS 62.8 37.1 17.2 34.1 
Standard Chartered 20.3 25.5 18.9 32.1 
Total  316.9 245.1 138.1 353.6 
Source: House of Commons Treasury Committee Report on Banking Crisis: dealing with the failure of the UK 
banks (2009). NB: Information on 2014 are based on figures collected from Yahoo Finance on the date.  
 
Table 2 below reports a number of important statistics about the UK banking sector and based on 
the Liikanen report (2012) puts the total assets values of the four biggest banks in the UK at over 
500% of its Gross Domestic Product, this is the highest in Western European countries.   
 
Table 2: Indicators of the size of UK banks 
Banks Total 
assets(€ 
million) 
Total 
assets/ 
national 
GDP 
(%) 
Total 
assets/ 
EUGDP 
(%) 
FTE 
Employee 
2011 
No. of 
European 
Branches 
∆ in total 
assets(% 
change 
2007-2011) 
HSBC 1967796 119.8 15.8 288316 1984 22.2 
Barclays 1871469 113.9 15.0 141100 2602 12.0 
RBS 1803649 109.8 14.5 146800 2477 -28.0 
Lloyds 
Banking 
Group 
1161698 70.7 9.3 98538 2956 141.5 
Standard 
Chartered 
461284 28.1 3.7 86865 3 104.5 
Source: Liikanen Report 2012 
 
Banking crises are not new. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) traced their history and found parallels 
between the current crisis and 18 earlier post-war banking crises in developed economies. 
However, the banking sector in the UK in 2007-2009 has been described as one of the worst 
crisis in its long history (Hall, 2008; Shin, 2009). Despite the financial crisis abating, there are 
anecdotal evidence that banks are still too cautious to lend to one another, let alone lend to the 
public and businesses for investment purposes, with adverse consequences on the productive and 
financing activities in the economy (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; Shin, 2009). 
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The glimpse of the crisis appeared in the late 2001 with wave of corporate collapse that affected 
the global economy. It was a surprise that the banking sector escaped unhurt, and there were 
predictions of the likely banking crisis if banks continued to use credit derivatives to offload 
their risks to the insurance and long term saving institutions (Hughes, 2002). Businesses 
continued as usual until the crisis in Northern Rock (Shin, 2009). The company’s troubles came 
to the fore when it sought support from the Bank of England to prop up its finances in the wake 
of its troubles from the US sub-prime market (Hall, 2008). The eventual collapse and bankruptcy 
filing was completed in 2007. Three other legendary UK financial institutions became significant 
victims of the banking crisis- Bradford and Bingley, Halifax Bank of Scotland, Royal Bank of 
Scotland. The rest of this section presents an analysis of the alleged causes of the distress in each 
of the four identified financial institutions. This is useful in designing the research methodology 
to be used in this study.   
 
Causes of the Banking Crisis 
 
Several causes have been adduced for the 2007 global financial crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2008) suggested that the crisis followed an historical pattern with initial housing market boom, 
increasing equity returns precipitating eventual market crash. These views have been re-echoed 
by the Governor of the Bank of England who said:   
 
“.... Investors, including banks, overlooked the fact that higher returns could be generated only 
by taking higher risks. As a result, money was lent on easier terms. That helped to push up 
further asset prices that had already risen as real interest rates were falling. It also led to an 
explosion in the size of the financial sector as new instruments were created to satisfy the search 
for yield. As well as lending to households and businesses, banks lent to other banks which 
bought ever more exotic instruments created by the financial system itself. The effect was to 
replicate the original risky loans many times over. Over the past five years, the balance sheets of 
many of the world’s largest banks more than doubled”  
 (House of Common Treasury Committee Report on the Banking Crises, 2009:15)  
 
This quote summarises the core factors that may have led to the crisis. Firstly, the chase for high 
yield that was pursued vigorously at the expense of proper and robust risk management 
procedures. International financial liberalisation meant that there was an abundance of 
investment capital coming from Asia and other part of the globe, aggravating the quest for yields 
to meet the expectations of the investors (Acharya and Richardson, 2009). So much so, that they 
extended credits to less credit worthy persons and purposes. The resulting debt payment default 
in one part of the global financial market was highly contagious leading to imported credit crisis 
(Barrell and Holland, 2007).  Secondly, in order to meet the extreme level of expected return, a 
number of complicated financial engineering through the use of derivatives and financial 
instruments were devised which inflated the net worth of many of these companies without the 
underlying assets to back the exponential growth in the balance sheets (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2008; Acharya and Richardson, 2009). A further complication in the system was the lack of 
clarity on the use and implications of these instruments making it difficult to regulate their use. 
Thirdly, and closely related to the earlier point, is the regulatory laxity and failures. The House 
of Common Treasury Committee report on the banking crisis criticised the regulatory authority 
for its failures and light touch approach to regulation of the financial sector.  
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Buiter (2007) suggested that the failure of the tripartite financial stability arrangement between 
the Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Service Authority may have been 
responsible for the financial crisis in the UK along other causes which he categorised to be both 
microeconomic and macroeconomic causes. The microeconomic causes include securitisation, 
flaws in the rating agencies’ business model and pro-cyclical behaviour in the financial system. 
The author noted the excessive global liquidity creation, and ex ante saving gluts as part of the 
macroeconomic causes of the crisis.  The next subsection presents a brief historical perspectives 
on the four banks focusing on their susceptibility to the crisis. 
 
Northern Rock (NR) 
Northern Rock, was at a point before its collapse, the fifth largest mortgage lender in the UK 
(Hall, 2008), and was formed as a result of the merger between the Northern Counties Permanent 
Building Society and Rock Building Society in 1965 and became listed on the London Stock 
Exchange in the 1990s when it demutualised. Its main business model was built around mortgage 
lending as well the traditional banking services. Its growth was more through acquisitions. The 
company had enjoyed a reasonable level of success in the mortgage lending business until the 
problems in the Sub-prime market forced it to seek financial support from the Bank of England 
as the lender of last resort having found it impossible securing lending from other financial 
institution even at a penal rate.  
 
The decision to seek funding from the Bank of England sent a wrong signal to the market where 
depositors’ confidence was already low. This led to the first ‘run’ on any British bank in over a 
century (Shin, 2009). The excessive use of securitisation and reliance on the wholesale funding 
has been identified as part of the main causes of the bank’s problems couple with poor risk 
management procedures. Although the management of the company insisted that their business 
model was good and that they would have survived if they had got the lifeline sought from the 
Bank of England before the whole saga became a public knowledge (Hall, 2008).  
 
Bradford and Bingley (BB)  
Bradford and Bingley started as a building society in 1851 and operated as such until 2000 when 
it demutualised and was transformed into a public limited company (Marshall, 2013; House of 
Common Treasury Committee Report on the Banking Crisis, 2009). Its operations as a Public 
Limited Company ended on the 29th September 2008. Two main factors have been identified as 
being crucial in its collapse. First was its business model that was hinged on the self-certified 
mortgage business.  
 
A self-certified mortgage is a riskier type of mortgage used by borrowers who do not have credit 
history. Mortgage contracts are entered without any formal credit checking or formal proof of 
financial ability to meet the obligations of the mortgage. The arrangement is very popular in the 
US and has been variously referred to as the sub-prime market. The incentive to the lender is that 
it offers a higher return on mortgage loans.  
 
Although this business model had been instrumental in the growth of the company, it has also 
played a large part in its collapse. The other factor that has been identified as playing key part in 
the collapse of the company was the series of deals it entered with an American company- 
General Motor Acceptance Corporation (GMAC). These involved a mixed portfolio of around 
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£650m that comprise buy-to let mortgages, self-certified and normal mortgages. The terms of the 
commitments were so restrictive that when the global economy turned on a backward slide, it 
was difficult for the management to renegotiate in response to the worsening global economic 
climate. With the slowdown in global economies, many borrowers were unable to meet up with 
their mortgage payments which brought significant strains on the company’s financial situation 
and eventually led to its collapse in September 2008 (House of Common Treasury Committee 
Report on the Banking Crisis, 2009)  
 
Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS)   
HBOS was formed in 2001 as a result of a merger between the oldest commercial bank in UK- 
the Bank of Scotland and Halifax, which was itself a product of another merger in 1997 between 
two demutualised building societies-the Halifax Benefit Building and Investment Societies 
(French et al., 2009). The company focuses on retail and corporate lending. However, 
management of the company admitted that the core model of the business was on the corporate 
lending. It emerged from the House Committee reports on the banking crisis that while the retail 
part of the business was profitable, the company’s doom has been shaped more by over reliance 
on wholesale funding. Furthermore, the poor attitude to risk management within the organisation 
has also been identified as one of the key factors that led to its share of the banking crisis. 
 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)  
 RBS was founded in 1727 and had grown both organically and through series of acquisitions. In 
2000, it acquired NatWest as well as the US mortgage lender Greenwich Capital which 
eventually exposed RBS to the US sub-prime mortgage market. The collapse of RBS was more 
to do with its purchase of the Dutch Bank ABN Amro in 2007 against all warnings from the 
Bank of England and concerns from within the organisation. The lack of due diligence on the 
purchase and over optimism of the economic climate and market trends were huge mistakes that 
have been admitted by the management in hindsight.  The overarching reason for the collapse of 
this banking giant was poor risk management and excessive leverage (House of Common 
Treasury Committee Report on the Banking Crisis, 2009).  
    
An important point to draw from the analyses above is that poor business model, and more 
importantly, poor risk management approaches played significant part in the banking crisis and 
specifically in the cases of the four financial institutions that were significantly affected. In the 
next section, the study presents the hypotheses and explains the methodology used. 
 
3. Literature review  
 
Previous studies (Abrahamson and Amir, 1996; Schleicher et al., 2007) have shown that 
investors rely on the information in the annual report for investment decisions and for its 
predictive potentials. It is therefore important that information in the annual report is decision 
useful. This could be achieved by having more forward-looking information on which various 
users of the annual report can base their decisions (Beattie et al., 2004). 
 
Studies have also examined specific parts of the annual report and their decision usefulness. For 
instance, Mayew et al. (2015) used textual disclosure in the Management Discussion and 
Analysis (MDandA) to predict firms’ ability to continue as a going concern for a sample of US 
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listed companies. Bryan (1997) examined the information content of the Management Discussion 
and Analysis (MDandA) as a basis for predicting firms’ future short-term performance. 
Tennyson et al. (1990) used content analysis of narratives in the annual report for bankruptcy 
predictions. Smith and Taffler (2000) used content analysis to study the chairman’s statement in 
the annual report. They examined the relationship between the content of the chairman’s 
statement and incidence of firm failures. They found that the chairman’s statement is able to 
classify firm as subsequently bankrupt or non-failed with a very high degree of accuracy. 
 
Previous studies have also explored the use of non-quantitative and narrative information in the 
annual reports as a basis for business failures prediction models. Schleicher et al. (2007) 
reviewed the annual reports of a sample of UK companies for forward-looking disclosure that 
was used as a basis for understanding the relationship between narratives in the annual reports of 
loss making firms and share price anticipation of earnings. This is similar to Davis et al.’s (2006) 
study on whether managers use optimistic and pessimistic languages in earnings press releases to 
provide information about expected future performance to the market, and whether the market 
responds to such languages. They found positive association between optimistic language usage 
and future firm performance, and negative association between pessimistic language in earning 
releases and future firm performance. This implies that positive and optimistic languages are 
correlated with better performance and negative and pessimistic languages are correlated with 
poor performance.   
 
Extant risk disclosure studies have focused, and rightly so, on risk disclosure orientation in terms 
of forward looking vs. historical (Dobbler et al., 2011), good vs. bad news (Linsley and Shrives, 
2006) and whether risk disclosure is voluntary or mandatory (Elshandidy and Neri, 2015), and 
other have examined risk disclosure generally, including the impacts of corporate governance 
(Elshandidy et al., 2013; Elzahar and Hussainey, 2012;  Miihkinen , 2012;  Ntim et al., 2013). 
However, not many studies have examined risk disclosures in the annual reports of UK banks 
and certainly not in the annual reports of the distressed banks during the recent financial crisis. 
This study examines the characteristics of the risk disclosures of four financial institutions that 
were distressed in the midst of the recent financial sector crisis. Addressing risk, and especially 
non-financial, disclosures in these companies enhances our understanding of the causes of the 
financial crisis from a different perspective compared to the popular approach in the literature 
where focus has been more on the systemic causes of the crisis, with little emphasis on the 
internal risk management dimensions.  It is argued that there is a need to focus on how 
organisations manage their exposures to risks and how this is reflected in the annual reports.  
 
Based on the explanations above, and following studies (Beattie et al., 2004) that argued that 
historical information might be less useful for investment and financing decisions. In the same 
vein, some studies have suggested that management disclose such information to mask poor firm 
performance (Cho et al., 2010; Clatworthy and Jones, 2001; Beattie and Jones, 2000), this study 
hypothesise that historical non-financial risk disclosures are negatively related to current and 
future firm performance.  
 
Furthermore, based on previous studies that have (Li, 2010; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2008; Smith 
and Taffler, 2000) argued that more forward-looking information should be provided in the 
annual report. Thereby prevent management impression management given that previous studies 
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have claimed that management are more forthright with good news rather than bad news 
(Kothari et al., 2009; Clatworthy and Jones, 2003), this study hypothesise that forward-looking 
risk disclosures are positively related with current and future firm performance. These 
hypotheses are presented below:  
 
 
Hypotheses 
   
H1: non-financial historical information in the risk disclosures are negatively related to 
current performance  
 
H2 non-financial forward looking information in the risk disclosures are positively related to 
current performance 
 
H3 non-financial historical information in the risk disclosures are negatively related to 
future performance 
 
H4 non-financial forward looking information in the risk disclosures are positively related to 
future performance 
 
In testing these hypotheses, the study explores a multiple method approach that integrates 
content analysis in a case study context with a panel analysis of the annual reports of the UK 
banks that were caught up in the financial crisis. The combinations of these methods allow an in-
depth analysis that would not have been possible if cross sectional or only time series were 
examined. The next section presents the methodology used in this study.  
 
 
4. Methodology 
 
In this section, the study provides a detailed explanation of the approach to content analysis. It is 
observed that there is a dearth of empirical study into narrative content of risk disclosure in 
annual reports. This study is the first to examine this for the four distressed banks in the UK. In 
order to test the hypotheses above, this study reviews the risk disclosure in the Business Review 
section of the annual reports of the four companies between 1998 and 2008. This provides a 34 
firm-year sample. To enhance the analysis and reduced human errors, the Concordance software2 
was used for textual analysis. This software is powerful in text-mining and analyses. Its main 
features include word counts, headwords manipulations, lemmatisation facility, Key Word In 
Context (KWIC) analysis, stop list, and collocation. First, the ‘stop list’ device was used to 
remove words that are not relevant in the analysis. They include personal pronouns such as He, 
She, It etc, and words that show articles e. A, An, The etc.  
 
Since the study objective relates to establishing relationship between firm performance and the 
content analysis of the narratives in the risk disclosures, time orientation dimension of disclosure 
                                                                
2 This is a software for text analysis which allows extensive in-depth analysis of text to gain greater insight. Further 
information on it can be found at:    http://www.concordancesoftware.co.uk 
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was used. This involves analysing the narratives along their historical, forward-looking and other 
dimensions (Beattie et al., 2004). To analyse the content along historical dimension, the study 
explored the risk disclosures for keywords that suggested historical contexts. To facilitate this 
process, it used the ‘sort by ending word’ facility in the software. This arranged all the keywords 
so that the ending letters are alphabetically arranged. All words that end with letter ‘D’ were 
picked. The author ensured that they are verbs and are in their past tense. This is because most of 
the verbs in English language form their past tense by adding ‘ed’ at the end of the word.  It was 
observed that some words end in ‘D’ but are not past tense. All such words were deleted; words 
that form their past tense by changing their structure were also searched and included. This 
process enabled us to categorise all remaining words as historical.  
 
Next, the study analysed the risk disclosures for forward-looking context. Hussainey et al. (2003) 
and Schleicher et al. (2007) suggested 35 words list that indicates a forward-looking context in a 
report. The current study builds on this by adding more words to this list. It generated a total of 
46 forward-looking word lists that could indicate forward-looking context in a report. To 
enhance the analysis, these words were lammatised. A lemmatising facility enhanced consistency 
in search and analysis process; this is because words could be brought together under a particular 
heading and keyword search could be undertaken for all the words under the heading. From this 
process the study was able to analyse the content of the risk disclosure in the annual reports of 
these companies along both historical and forward looking dimensions.  
 
The study then calculated the rate of change in these pieces of information over the periods for 
which data are available. Studies (Korol, 2013; Sharma and Mahjan, 1980) have shown that 
failed businesses show sign of their hailing between a couple of (2-5) years before their failure 
and a year afterwards. This study therefore compares the rate of change in the pieces of 
information over these periods for each of the companies in this investigation.  Next, the study 
describes its measure of current and future firm performance. Qiu et el. (2006) defined their firm 
future performance with reference to Return on Equity, Schleicher et al. (2007) used share prices 
as the basis for defining a firm’s future performance. This study uses two measurement bases for 
current and future firm performance; Dividend (DVND) and Earnings Per Share (EPS). 
Information on these variables were collected from the annual reports.  
 
To test the hypotheses, panel data approach with random model was used following confirmation 
of its suitability after Hausman test (Baltagi and Liu, 2008).  A panel data combines the 
advantage of the cross-sectional and time series dimensions of an investigation. Thus, this allows 
us to examine the same variables for the same set of companies over different time period. The 
panel data model is formally stated as: 
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The current performance regression models are based on equation 1 above. Equation 2 below is 
used for the growth in future performance regression model.  
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The growths in each of the base measures for these periods were calculated as a proxy for future 
firm performance. This is formally stated as: 
 
                ΔX=     t
tt
X
XX 1
……………………………………………(3) 
Where: 
Xt= represents our measure of performance for period t 
Xt+1= represent our measure of performance in period t+1 (a year later) 
 
Equation 3 below is the basis of the positive time lag future performance regression model.  
)4....(................................................................................5
43211
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5. Results  
 
Table 3 below presents the summary of the panel data profile. It shows the study is based on 34 
firm years.  
 
Table 3: Panel Data Profile  
Company Period Total 
HBOS 2001-2007 7years 
RBS 2001-2007 7years 
Northern Rock 1998-2008 11years 
Bradford and Bingley 2000-2008 9years 
  34 years 
 
Table 4 presents the variables in the data and their definitions. Tables 5 and 6 present the 
descriptive statistics. Table 5 shows that on average there are more   historical information in the 
risk disclosure of the companies investigated than forward information. 
 
Table 4: Variable Definition for all variables used in the study  
Variable  Sign Definition  
FP  Future performance in each of the years. Proxy with growth rate 
in: 
DND= Dividend 
ΔDND= this is change in dividend and it is defined as the 
dividend for this year less last year’s dividend divided by last 
year’s dividend.  
EPS= Earnings Per Share which is given as net operating profit 
divided by outstanding shares in a firm.  
ΔEPS= is the change in the in EPS and it is defined as the EPS for 
this year minus EPS last year divided by EPS last year.  
HRIC +ve Historical narratives information in the  risk disclosures in the 
annual reports  
FWD -ve Forward-looking narrative Information in the risk disclosure in 
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the annual reports  
OPT +ve Optimistic enhancing narrative information in the risk disclosures 
in the annual reports 
PESS -ve Pessimistic enhancing narratives information in the risk 
disclosures in the annual reports 
WORD +ve Total word count in the risk disclosure. 
FIRMSIZE  Natural log of total assets 
EQUITYTOASSET  Equity divided by total asset 
INCOMETOASSET  Natural log of Net income divided by total assets 
LNASSET +ve Natural log of total asset in a firm 
 
With historical information being 310 words on the average compared to 191 words for forward 
looking information. Historical information also has higher level of variations compared to 
forward looking information as shown by the standard deviation figures. Pessimistic enhancing 
words are more on the average in the risk disclosure for these companies compared to optimistic 
enhancing words. The average total word disclosure for the companies in the study was 1465 
words with the lowest being 717 words compared to the highest of 2231 words.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for all variables used in the study  
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HRIC 34 310.559 131.355 124 510 
FWD 34 191.000 117.821 39 398 
OPT 34 98.382 59.748 11 250 
PESS 34 127.294 47.849 24 201 
WORD 34 1464.824 478.152 717 2231 
DND 34 23.791 14.632 0 52.5 
ΔDND 34 0.065 0.549 -1 2.61 
EPS 34 57.176 48.183 -65.6 159.3 
ΔEPS 34 0.115 1.097 -1.69 5.54 
LNASSET 34 7.39 6.36 1 14.69 
EQUITYTOASSET 34 2.29 1.5 0.46 5.22 
INCOMETOASSET 34 2.58 2.06 0 4.50 
 
Tables 6 shows that, on average, 21% of the content of the risk disclosure for the companies in 
this study are historical information, 12% are forward looking information, and 7% are 
optimistic enhancing words with 9% being pessimistic enhancing words.   
 
Table 6: Percentage of Word Categories in the Risk Disclosures  
Variable  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
HRIC 34 20.683 3.610 15.21 28.12 
FWD 34 12.175 5.240 4.97 26.40 
OPT 34 7.330 4.163 1.61 15.96 
PESS 34 9.081 3.046 1.08 15.67 
 
Table 7 below presents the correlation matrix for the variables in the investigation. The high 
correlation between the total risk disclosures and historical risk disclosures are expected as this 
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constitutes the larger proportion of risk disclosure for these companies similarly is the correlation 
between net income as a function of total asset and equity as a function of total asset as both 
have common denominator.  
 
Table 7: Correlation matrix for all variables used in the study  
 Variables  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 HRIC  1.00          
2 FWD 0.83 1.00         
3 OPT 0.16 -0.11 1.00        
4 PESS 0.62 0.24 0.56 1.00       
5 WORD 0.92 0.84 0.14 0.45 1.00      
6 DVND 0.38 0.60 -0.25 -
0.04 
0.50 1.00     
7 EPS 0.14 0.39 -0.20 -
0.14 
0.29 0.64 1.00    
8 LNASSET 0.29 0.21 -0.00 0.12 0.31 0.39 0.38 1.00   
9 EQUITYTOASSET  0.06 -0.0 0.04 0.00 0.10 0.16 0.29 0.78 1.00  
10 INCOMETOASSET  -
0.02 
-0.12 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.66 0.96 1.00 
 
Table 8 below presents the first set of regression results relating to current performance and non-
financial risk disclosures. The regressions show high R2 at 71% and 69% respectively for model 
1 and model 2. The results (model 1 and model 2) show a significant negative relationship 
between narrative historical information and current period performance. These results are 
consistent for both definition of current period performance measures (Dividend and EPS). This 
supports hypothesis H1 indicating that these banks had more historical information when they 
were having poor performance and less when their performances were positive. Hypothesis H2 
regarding the relationship between forward-looking information and current performance, the 
results of the regression show a significant positive relationship consistent with the prediction of 
this study. These results indicate that firms with more forward looking information are more 
likely to report positive current performance, thus supporting H2. The regression results in Table 
8 also show that firm size and equity over asset, which is a measure of efficiency in capital 
utilisation, are increasing functions of current period performance but net income as a proportion 
of total asset is decreasing in current period performance.  
 
Table 8: Risk disclosure and current period performance  
Independent variable  DVND EPS 
 Model 1 Model 2 
HRIC  -0.04 
-1.98** 
-0.17 
-2.43** 
FWD 0.09 
3.96*** 
0.28 
3.60*** 
LNASSET 1.14 
2.79** 
4.26 
3.07*** 
EQUITYTOASSET  5.47 
4.23*** 
18.99 
4.31*** 
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INCOMETOASSET  -3.02 
-2.81** 
-12.43 
-2.68** 
Constant  2.41 
0.426 
2.61 
0.145 
R2 71% 69% 
F-statistics  7.98*** 8.83*** 
 
 
Table 9 below presents the results of the regression testing the relationship between narrative risk 
disclosures and measures of future performance. The results show that when future performance 
was measured by a positive lag performance (model 3) there was no significant relationship 
between narrative risk disclosures and future firm performance. However, when future firm 
performance was measured with respect to growth in earnings per share, there was a significant 
negative relationship between narrative risk disclosures and future firm performance, consistent 
with the prediction in the study. These results therefore support hypothesis H3 but only when 
future performance was defined in terms of growth. Similarly, the regression results in model 4 
Table 9 support hypothesis H4 of a significant positive relationship between forward looking 
narrative risk disclosures and future firm performance for the distressed banks. These results 
simply indicate that current period narrative risk disclosures can predict future period 
performance when this is measured in terms of growth in earnings per share. The result was not 
supported when future performance was defined in terms of dividend or profit before tax. Unlike 
models 1 and 2, the control variables are not all significant in models 3 and 4. In model 3, future 
performance was only positively related to size of the firm and capital utilisation but not with net 
income as a fraction of total assets. In model 4, future performance was only marginally related 
to capital utilisation in the firm.   
 
Table 9: Risk disclosure and future performance  
Dependent variable  EPSt+1 ∆EPS 
Variables  Model 3 Model 4 
HRIC  -0.15 
-0.61 
-1.96 
-2.36** 
FWD 0.15 
0.80 
1.04 
2.45** 
LNASSET 3.59 
2.61** 
0.02 
0.92 
EQUITYTOASSET  10.92 
2.17** 
0.23 
1.84* 
INCOMETOASSET  -6.91 
-1.50 
-0.05 
-0.54 
Constant  0.512 
1.69 
0.33 
0.411 
R2 60% 19% 
F-Statistics  3.25*** 2.56** 
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Additional analysis: Optimistic and Pessimistic Tone in Risk Disclosure  
 
Prasad and Mir (2002) argued that the annual report is a powerful tool that management uses to 
signal to the intended recipients of the information in it. Also Davis et al. (2008) analysed 
information in the annual reports to discover the optimistic and pessimistic language which was 
then used as a predictive basis. In addition to the analysis above, this study followed this 
intuition and analysed the risk disclosures in the annual reports of the distressed banks in the UK 
to explore the potential that management overtly or covertly sent either optimistic or pessimistic 
signals to the users of the information contained in it. Davis et al. (2008) categorised words that 
are positive in nature as being optimistic enhancing and words that are intrinsically negative as 
pessimistic enhancing. For example, while words such as revenue, profit, income, increase, 
improve etc. were categorised as optimistic enhancing, words such as costs, taxes, decreasing, 
minimal, ineffective, not, fall, downwards were categorised as pessimistic enhancing words (see 
appendix 1). These words were lemmatised and headword search conducted. These produced 
two categories labelled as optimistic and pessimistic enhancing respectively. The regression 
results in Table 10 below show that optimistic and pessimistic languages in narrative risk 
disclosure were not determinants of current and future firm performance (result for future 
performance not reported).  
 
Table 10: Optimistic and Pessimistic Tone in Narrative risk Disclosure  
Dependent variable  DVND EPS 
Variables  Model 1 Model 2 
HRIC  -0.082 
-1.84* 
-0.22 
-1.38 
FWD 0.08 
3.41*** 
0.18 
1.77* 
OPT 0.02 
0.37 
0.06 
0.34 
PESS 0.01 
0.13 
-0.15 
-1.00 
WORD 0.02 
1.20 
0.04 
1.47 
LNASSET 0.21 
0.23 
0.66 
0.20 
EQUITYTOASSET  -0.72 
-1.53 
 
-2.75 
-1.66 
INCOMETOASSET  12.33 
-1.33 
48.4 
1.47 
Constant  3.41 
0.636 
-10.6 
0.661 
R2 62% 63% 
F-Statistics  41.02*** 39.2*** 
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6. Conclusion and Future Research 
 
This study explores the risk narratives disclosures in the business review section of the annual 
reports of the four financial institutions in the UK that were significantly affected by the 
2007/8banking crisis. The study focused on this type of disclosure in this part of the annual 
report because it is under researched, and also because one of the common causes of distress in 
these institutions was poor risk management. This study found that there is more historical than 
forward looking information in the annual reports of these companies. Future firm performance 
was proxied with growth in earning per share, and a positive lag measure of EPS. Current period 
performance was proxied with dividend and earnings per share. The study found a significant 
negative relationship between current period historical narrative risk disclosure and current 
period performance. The study also reports a significant positive relationship between forward 
looking narrative risk disclosure and current period performance. In terms of future performance, 
only growth in earnings per share showed a significant relationship with narrative risk 
disclosures. Historical risk narrative showed a significant negative relationship with future 
performance and forward looking risk narrative showed a significant positive relationship with 
future performance proxied with growth in EPS.  Both historical and forward looking narrative 
disclosures are not related to future performance when performance was defined in terms of 
dividend, profit before tax (these reported were not reported) and positive lag of EPS.  
 
The results in this study show that narrative risk disclosure has decision usefulness for different 
stakeholders, especially investors. It shows that current risk disclosures could be a veritable 
indicator of potential future performance of a company. Regulators should be interested in these 
results because they show the value relevance of the narrative risk disclosures and are thus 
consistent with the request for more forward looking disclosures by firms. The findings from this 
study also show that it is possible to identify warning signal in the narrative in annual reports 
and, therefore, the integrated reporting currently being proposed should include an integration of 
narrative disclosures. 
 
Being exploratory research, the results from this study should be interpreted with caution 
because of the following limitations. First, the study adds to the number of studies attempting to 
provide an alternative approach to understanding business failures using narratives in the annual 
reports. This approach is evolving and therefore has inherent limitations. For example, the use of 
content analysis still needs further development to streamline its applications and reduce the 
subjectivity currently involved. The study adopts a case study approach that examines a specific 
event within a context; the UK banking sector following the banking crisis. It is likely that the 
result would be different if a different approach was used. This may involve banks from other 
jurisdictions. Studies undertaking this type of investigation will need to control for country 
effects which this current study did not consider. It may then be possible to use a bigger sample 
size and this may allow more general results to be generated which could lead to the 
generalisability of findings which is not possible with this study, and is not the purpose of this 
current investigation. The use of words, phrases, themes and sentences frequency as indicators of 
subject importance could be criticised as being a soft approach to measurement. Furthermore, 
application of a panel data approach to a small sample size may have affected our result. 
However, this has been corrected by reducing the number of explanatory variables to This study 
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was not about the quality of risk disclosures, but about their characteristics. This is an important 
area that is under researched. Future studies could focus on the disclosure practices of listed 
companies comparing profitable with non-profitable companies.  
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Appendices  
Forward looking Word Lists  
Accelerate  Anticipate Await 
Coming –year  Months  Confidence 
Confident  Convince Current  
Financial year  Envisage Eventual  
Expect Forecasts Forthcoming 
Hope Intend Unlikely 
Likely Ahead Next 
Novel  Optimistic  Outlook 
Plan Planning Predict 
Remain New Shall  
Scope Shortly Soon 
Will Target Objective 
Continue Goal  Risk 
Value at risks Probability  Future  
 
Optimistic Enhancing Words  
Increasing  Increase Improve Improvement Improving  
Favourable  Rise  Rising  Benefit  Benefiting  
Benefits  Forward Upwards Opportunity  Advantage 
Growth  Income  Revenue  Profit Profitable  
Efficiency  Effectiveness Overcome  Success Successful  
Successfully Earnings Earning    
 
 
Pessimistic Enhancing Words 
Decrease Decreasing  Lower  Below Exposure  
Minimal  Not  Downward Backward Falling  
Fall  Dangerously Unfortunately  Expenses Costs 
Cost Taxes Loss Arrears Arrear 
Ineffective Inefficient  Unsecured Securitize Securitisation  
Bad Bad debts Fails Unsure   
 
 
 
